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In a landmark vote, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly decided on
September 9 to begin work on a multilateral legal framework—effectively a treaty or convention
—for sovereign debt restructuring, in order to improve the global financial system. The
resolution was introduced by Bolivia on behalf of the “Group of 77” developing nations and
China. In part, it was sparked by recent litigation in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to
comply with a pari passu clause (imposing an equal-and-ratable repayment obligation),
Argentina could not pay holders of exchanged bonds without also paying holdouts who retained
the original bonds. That decision was all the more dramatic because the holdouts included
hedge funds—sometimes characterized as “vulture funds”—that purchased the original bonds at
a deep discount, yet sued for full payment.
Regardless of what one thinks of that Supreme Court decision, there is a critical need for a
sovereign debt restructuring convention. Sovereign debt problems must be addressed
systematically for two reasons, of which the first is to avoid the high cost of having to bail out
financially troubled nations. As the financial woes of Greece and other European Union
countries have shown, that cost can be onerous both to governments and individuals. The
European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and many of the world’s leading central
banks have essentially been forced to underwrite EU-nation bailouts in order to restore financial
market confidence. And citizens of the bailed-out nations have been forced to accept harsh
austerity measures as a condition of the bailouts, leading to riots, strikes, and widespread
anger.
The second reason that sovereign debt problems must be addressed systematically, through a
legal framework, is that (absent such a framework) the only alternative to a bailout is likely to be
a default. Yet the growing interrelationship between country debt and financial markets
increases the risk that a debt default will trigger a systemic economic collapse. This reveals a
phenomenon viewed until recently as limited to large banks—the problem of “too big to fail.” A
bank whose default could trigger an economic domino effect is, or at least may be perceived to
be, too big to fail. It therefore must be bailed out by public funds. This can foster moral hazard:
anticipating a bail-out, the bank may lack incentive to take a prudent economic course.
Countries, even those as small as Greece, can likewise be seen as too big to fail if their default
could trigger wider economic collapse. That too can foster moral hazard. The Greek
government, for example, did little to impose fiscal austerity even as debts accumulated.
So what would a sovereign debt restructuring convention look like? Effectively, it would be an
international treaty that establishes debt restructuring protocols. The most well-known historical
example was the IMF’s proposed sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, which was originally
conceived by scholars (including the author of this blog; see Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 Cornell Law Review 956 (2000)). Whatever example is
used, any such convention should have at least two primary goals: a mechanism to penalize
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creditors (such as vulture funds) who strategically hold out from fair settlements, hoping that the
imperative to settle will persuade others to grant the holdouts more than their fair share; and an
incentive to attract sufficient voluntary funding to enable the settlement to work.
The first goal can be achieved by a form of “super-majority” voting on the settlement, in which
the vote by the overwhelming majority of similarly situated creditors can bind the few dissenting
parties. This is the tried-and-true method by which insolvency law successfully, and equitably,
addresses the holdout problem and achieves consensual debt restructuring. Although similar
clauses (so-called collective action clauses) are sometimes included in bond contracts, they
rarely address problems that go beyond their own bond issue. Moreover, the reality is that many
sovereign bond contracts lack these types of clauses, notwithstanding years of discussion about
including them. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical
Comparison, 2 Harvard Business Law Review 95 (2012) (comparing collective action contracts
and a statutory approach).
The second goal—the incentive to attract voluntary funding—can be achieved by enabling
financiers of a settlement to be repaid before other creditors. All creditors are protected because
if the amount of this financing is too high or its terms are inappropriate, the financing will not
receive the overwhelming approval needed to bind all creditors.
Such a consensual restructuring would not undermine the rule of law, as would an attempt by a
nation to unilaterally impose a “haircut” on its bonds. Nor should it increase sovereign borrowing
costs. A nation whose debt has been restructured should be able to borrow at attractive rates. In
the non-sovereign context, for example, the lending rates to restructured companies are much
lower than the rates charged before the restructuring.
Ironically, the United States opposed the U.N. resolution on the grounds that an international
sovereign debt restructuring convention would be likely to create economic uncertainty. That
stance is rather hard to substantiate, especially when one recognizes that such a convention is
effectively based on the same principles and legal rules that govern corporate debt restructuring
under U.S. bankruptcy law. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 Emory Law Journal 1189 (2004) (describing why, and how, the same rules of
law that underlie Chapter 11 corporate debt restructuring should also apply to sovereign debt
restructuring). The reality is that an international sovereign debt restructuring convention should
benefit developed nations as much as developing ones. As finance becomes more intertwined,
most nations will become too big to fail. Without an effective sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism, we will all end up subsidizing those nations that lack the political will or ability to be
fiscally responsible.
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Before placing too much faith in a sovereign debt restructuring convention, one
should consider the probability of its ratification–particularly by the U.S. Senate.
Adoption of a proposed treaty by the UNGA does not make it law. Even if it
comes into force, it will only be in force in those nations that have ratified it. If a
major economic actor, like the US, does not ratify it, the dissenting creditors will
still be able to wreck havoc on the debtor in the courts of that state. There are
many fine treaties lined up ahead of this proposal that the Senate has not even
taken up.
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